Facts, Values and the Psychology of the Human Person

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Abstract

The notion of value neutrality has been a contentious issue within the human and social sciences for some time. In this paper, some of the philosophical and scientific bases for the confusion surrounding the fact-value dichotomy are covered and the discrepancy between how psychology studies values and expresses them is noted. The sense of value neutrality is clarified historically and the clarified meaning of the term applied to some qualitative data demonstrating in what sense values may be expressed in psychology. The position is upheld that psychology as a human science intentionally should not be absolutely value free in the sense that human reality has to be studied in a non-reductionistic manner and thus methods of study must be respectful of the full ethical sense of humanness. This is simply meeting the phenomenological requirement of "fidelity to the phenomenon". However, psychology can be value free in the historical sense of the term properly understood because it refers to the fact that the personal values of the scientists ought not to be conflated with scientific findings. The discussion of values takes place primarily within the context of science, where the problem of value neutrality emerged, but it is acknowledged that non-scientific approaches to value have merit and can also be compelling.

Introduction

Nothing is more important than assuring that the scientific knowledge gained in any field is used wisely, and that concern leads one directly to the issue of values. However, the status of the relationship between knowledge and values has a troubled history and the current status of the relationship is controversial. Knowledge requires an epistemological perspective - but the assessment of the value of knowledge requires an evaluative perspective, a perspective that is quite different from an epistemological one.

Moreover, the two perspectives can easily get entangled, since one has to *evaluate* epistemological procedures in order to ensure that the knowledge gained is reliable, and one therefore has to *know* how to evaluate knowledge properly. While acceptable epistemological procedures seem to be closer to consensus within the scientific community, the area of values seems to be unsettled in the extreme. The diversity of opinion with respect to the status of values is probably what prompted the philosopher Nicholas Rescher (1969), in his book on theories of values, to write:

> In the English language the word (value) is used in a somewhat loose and fluctuating way. Philosophers and social scientists concerned with value questions have long recognized the need for a more precise terminology to facilitate the exact formulations needed in scholarly and scientific contexts. But this desideratum seems to be the only point of agreement ... . [A]ll their positive efforts have failed. (p. 1)

The field of "value scholarship" is vast and contradictory, and so, in order to make my task manageable, what I propose to do is the following. Firstly, I will focus on the meaning of "value neutrality"; I will then provide a brief sketch of the history of the philosophical mode of inquiring into the fact-value dichotomy within the Anglo-American and the Continental traditions respectively; then I will turn to how values are treated within psychology, both explicitly and implicitly; and finally I will indicate some of the values that I believe are necessary for an adequate psychology of the human person. The clarification of the proper sense of "value neutrality" will help to determine whether psychologists are to embrace it or not.

Before proceeding, however, it should be noted that three categories of scholarship in this area seem to be ambiguously intermingled, namely *values*, *ethics* and *morality*. To research one area means that it is very easy to spill over into the other two areas. Basically, however, *value* refers to the worth of an object or phenomenon; *ethics* refers to patterns or ways of life, including the rules that govern those patterns of living; and *morality* involves beliefs about the nature of humans and the values that are worth pursuing. With morality, often the rules concerning what ought to be done and not be done are included. Common to all three areas of inquiry is the concern with the question of "ought", although not exclusively. That is, there is always the question whether or not certain values or moral or ethical rules should exist and be pursued or obeyed. Thus the question of what is, or what ought to be, consistently haunts these issues. Neither philosophers nor scientists have as yet sorted out these questions with such clarity that a consensus is achieved.

Value Neutrality

Philosophical Context
It sometimes seems that the idea of "value neutrality" refers to the notion that a scientist may gain knowledge about any phenomenon whatsoever without worrying about the implications or consequences of that knowledge. That notion is not correct, however, but it seems to be a popular misunderstanding concerning the term. However, before getting to the proper meaning of "value neutrality", I want to speak briefly to the context that fostered the separation of facts from values in the West.

According to Taylor (1989), the ideal of value neutrality is correlated with that phase of philosophical development known as "modernity".

His interpretation of this development is not universally accepted by all philosophers in all of its aspects, but it does offer a plausible perspective on why facts and values were separated so that it seemed as though facts could be considered in isolation from their intrinsic contexts. Taylor (1985b, p. 256) asserts that, "prior to the seventeenth century, the dominant cosmologies saw the universe as a meaningful order". That is, it was an order in which everything made sense, and included in the sense-making was the understanding that everything was in its place in the schema of the cosmos. To be perfectly in tune with the cosmos was the meaning of rationality in the Platonic era. For the ancients, rationality did not mean the following of logical rules or adhering to types of evidence. To speak the truth meant to apprehend the ideal forms described by Plato - but the Platonic forms were not separated from the cosmic order, and so there was holistic harmony. It is important to appreciate that this meant that the sources of the moral order were external to the self.

Then St. Augustine came along and identified the Platonic forms with the Divine ideas of God. So, rather than being external to humans, as with Plato, access to truth became a matter of probing the inner self because of the intimacy between God and the self in Augustinian thought. But humans were still properly placed within the cosmos. What Augustine did, however, was to introduce a first person perspective for accessing the self. This was a new development.

Then, with Descartes, Taylor (1989) claims that modernity began, because he radicalised the internal perspective initiated by Augustine with his emphasis on the cogito and radical reflexivity. God was still on the scene as the One Who guaranteed the truth, but the self began its separation from the cosmos. This happened in part because Descartes had a problem to contend with that the ancients didn't: he had to account for the development of the natural sciences. As Gutting (1999) puts it: "[Modern science] rejected the teleological view of nature and saw the material world as a purely mechanistic system. The result was a dissolution of the Platonic and Augustinian connection between cosmic and moral order. The natural world was no longer a moral source" (p. 116). This perspective was then developed further by the Enlightenment with the work of Bacon and Locke and their successors. No external authorities were to be trusted; only the self could be trusted. But the self became diminished as each of its own activities was critically challenged. Taylor (1989) claims that Locke established what he calls "the punctual self", describing it as follows:

> The key to this figure (punctual self) is that it gains control through dis-engagement. Disengagement is always correlative of an 'objectification' ... . Objectifying a given domain involves depriving it of its normative force for us. If we take a domain of being in which hitherto the way things are has set norms for us and take a new stance to it as neutral, I will speak of our objectifying it. The great mechanization of the scientific world picture of the seventeenth century, which Descartes helped to carry out, was an objectification in this sense. (p. 160)

Gutting (1999) summarizes Taylor's view by stating that in modernity "We have to withdraw from every alleged source of epistemic authority and put it under critical scrutiny. ... So even the self has to be an object of our disengaged scrutiny" (pp. 118-119). The Enlightenment, in its modernizing tendencies, produced cultural processes that transformed societies: "These changes include secularization, urbanization, industrialization, the disenchantment of the world, increased emphasis on instrumental rationality, the rise of science and a concomitant belief in the separation of fact and value" (Abbey, 2000, p. 78). Science did not develop in a vacuum; major cultural changes are associated with its development.

Weber's Perspective

The ideal of value neutrality was strongly supported by Max Weber, and it was perhaps he who gave the most thorough articulation of this complex notion. Clearly, it was an idea that was controversial in his day (Freund, 1968). Weber (1949) argued against the idea that a scientist, because of his prestige and reputation, could impose his personal and partisan views on others. Succinctly put, the idea of value neutrality in Weber is his stance against arbitrary subjectivism. In this sense he is an Enlightenment thinker. He is not against the presence of values as such, but against unsubstantiated subjectively determined values, stating his position as follows:

> It is as we said in the beginning, quite clear that in these discussions, we are concerned with *practical* evaluations regarding the desirability or un-desirability of social facts from ethical, cultural or other points of view ... . What is really at issue is the intrinsically simple demand that the investigator and teacher should keep unconditionally separate the establishment of unconditional facts (including the "value

oriented" conduct of the empirical individual whom he is investigating) and *his* own practical evaluations, i.e., his evaluation of these facts as satisfactory or unsatisfactory (including among these facts evaluations made by the empirical persons who are the objects of investigation). These two things are logically different and to deal with them as though they were the same represents a confusion of entirely heterogeneous problems. (pp. 10-11)

Weber sometimes describes his position as the difference between science and conviction. This means that one should never make science conform to subjective beliefs, no matter how strongly they are held (Freund, 1968, p. 84). However, if the value is treated scientifically, then it belongs within the discourse of science.

Weber's notion also extends to those phenomena that may be censured by society, such as murder, prostitution or rape. That is, Weber believed that such phenomena should be studied with the same strict objectivity as those phenomena of which society approved - such as, for example, religious beliefs or patriotism. In other words, the scientist should never make a direct value judgment of the phenomenon he or she is studying, because such a judgment would not be made within the context of a scientific method. For Weber, science required procedures of rational determination.

However, Weber also affirmed that scientists had to engage in "value orientation", which is quite different from value neutrality. Value orientation is the label Weber used for the fact that the scientist plays a role in deciding upon the problems that he or she wants to work on. According to Freund (1968), "value orientation is the subjective factor which enables the scientist to acquire limited objective knowledge (of the world), always provided that he or she is conscious of this limitation" (p. 54). So it is quite other than a value judgment. It requires clear thinking and it is expected that mere personal experience and vague emotionality are eliminated. In a sense, Weber is arguing for the removal of personal subjectivity - but not subjectivity as such. There is an implied bracketing of the personal here.

Thus, value neutrality is a way of trying to handle the problem of researcher bias based upon extra-scientific factors. But, if the values that one wants to advocate have a scientific basis, then one can argue for them on the basis of the evidence. This position obviously assumes the priority of the scientific perspective.

So why is this distinction so hard to grasp? I think it is because the sense of objectivity became conflated with the sense of neutrality. If a social scientist wanted to be truly scientific, he or she had to be objective, and somehow the connotation of value neutrality merged with that of objectivity. For example, Taylor (1985a) lamented the fact that political philosophy, a source of values, had become separated from political science:

> The view was indeed that political science has come of age in freeing itself finally of the incubus of political philosophy. No more would its scope be narrowed and its work prejudiced by some value position which operated as an initial weight holding back the whole enterprise. The belief was that political science had freed itself from philosophy in becoming value-free and in adopting the scientific method. These two moves were felt to be closely connected; indeed the second contains the first. For scientific method is, if nothing else, a dispassionate study of the facts as they are, without metaphysical presuppositions, and without value biases. (p. 58)

Taylor himself disagrees with this interpretation and goes on to demonstrate how the discovery of certain political facts implies a context of values. But note, the very adoption of the scientific method is meant to imply the acquisition of value-free facts. This conflation can be seen in other social sciences as well.

Friedrichs (1970), for example, in commenting on how this conflation impacted upon sociology, wrote that, under value neutrality, "[the sociologist's] task, like the natural scientists', was to discover empirical uniformities that could be used to predict and control other empirical phenomena. Woe to the doctoral candidate who dared question the union of objectivity with neutrality" (p. 81). Friedrichs noted that another implication of the conflation was that there was a flight in sociology from the study of social problems. He reported that, in sociology, this change came about because "sociology had been redefined as a descriptive rather than as a normative science" (p. 85). Apparently, according to Friedrichs, sociologists "concluded that because theories of social problems were normative in nature rather than empirical they thus were outside the province of the scientist. The effort to construct such theories merely reflected a misguided effort to seek scientific objectivity under conditions where it was in principle impossible" (p. 85). Friedrichs claims that the transformation of sociology from normative to descriptive science occurred under the "cloak of neutrality" (p. 80). One

consequence of the restrictions imposed on sociology by its transformation was that it led to the awareness that perhaps science itself was *the* social problem. I would also note in passing that a descriptive science need not be "value neutral".

I'd also like to provide an example from psychology. Nicholson (1998) recently wrote an interesting article on the relationship between character and personality. He points out that, during the 19th century and the early 20th century, there were many studies of character, and contemporaries of Wundt and some of his early successors wrote books on characterology. In part this was because character was an important term in the Victorian age. Independent confirmation of the importance of character in psychology is given by Malcolm (2005) who, in writing about Gertrude Stein, a student of William James, noted that, when Stein left medical school because she was bored by it, she nevertheless retained her interest in psychology, because she and her brother, Leo, who lived together between 1903 and 1913, consistently analysed the characters of their friends. In other words, it was assumed that interest in psychology meant focusing on character.

Nicholson (1998) notes that:

> *Character* usually referred to the nature of the internal qualities of an individual. To have character, a person's traits had to have substance, durability, and integrity. Traits had to come together in an enduring, cohesive, and morally uplifting totality. The moral dimension was particularly important. The character ideal was all about realizing selfhood by internalizing the values of a supposedly permanent moral order. As Emerson noted in an often-quoted passage, "character is moral order seen through the medium of an individual nature". (p. 54)

What happened, however, is that personality became a substitute for character because it stripped individuality of all moral overtones. Ironically, Gordon Allport (1937) played a critical role in this development, although he was not aware of the unintended consequences of his definition that went against his purposes. The classic line in his book, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*, reads: "*Character is personality evaluated, and personality is character devaluated*" [italics in original] (p. 52). Here is a clear case where valuation is simply stripped from the phenomenon. Personality traits were scientific phenomena, but character and terms of virtue were seen to be the normative terms of a social

ethics.

> Thus science came to be defined as the activity of perceiving the world as a neutral domain of facts rather than a locus of meanings through which one can understand oneself and one's place in the world. ... The comforting interpretation of the world as having a meaningful order was sacrificed to the aim of scientifically describing and explaining the world as it is, undistorted by dogma, personal desires or, indeed, any human interpretation. (Fowers, 2005, pp. 18-19).

The fact that value terms were never quite eliminated from the study of persons did not prevent those who adopted the above position from trying harder and harder to remove subjectivity from the study of the person, as contradictory as that may sound.

However, if we take a connotation of objectivity other than neutrality - for example, accuracy - then I see no intrinsic contradiction between being accurate and valuing something highly. To be objective also implies that one can report phenomena accurately; that is, as they really present themselves to our experience. Think of a researcher trying to prove his or her pet hypothesis. The researcher is looking for certain facts that will support his or her thesis. This means that those desired facts will be highly valued should they emerge. But let's suppose that the opposite happens. The researcher really desires (in other words, values) one set of facts but the opposite facts come forth. Eventually, most researchers would acknowledge that what they valued did not come about, and so, in the name of objectivity, for the sake of truthfulness or accuracy, they will admit that their hypothesis was not supported. Or, to take a more mundane situation, think of all of the lottery players who hope desperately for a specific number to be announced and then reluctantly have to accept that the highly valued hoped-for number was not picked. In such situations one is not at all neutral about an outcome, but one nevertheless yields to non-supportive evidence. Objectivity does not have to mean neutrality, but it would be interesting to know more specifically why it took on that connotation.

Brief Historical Philosophical Background of the Fact-Value Distinction

As with most things philosophical, there are differences between the empirical-analytical Anglo-American philosophical approach and the continental-phenomenological philosophical approach. I shall begin with the former.

Apparently, the first one in relatively recent times to note that there was a difference between facts and values was the eighteenth century philosopher, David Hume, when in his *Treatise* he wrote:

> In every system of morality ... the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning … when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions *is* and *is not,* I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought* or *ought not*. This change is imperceptible ... . For as this *ought* or *ought not* expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observ'd and explain'd. (Hume, 1740; cited in MacIntyre, 1959, pp. 451-452)

This passage constitutes the basis for a longstanding interpretation that one cannot derive values from facts. Or, as the philosopher MacIntyre (1959) puts it, "The standard interpretation of this passage takes Hume to be asserting here that no set of nonmoral premises can entail a moral conclusion" (p. 452). This position was given a big boost by the British philosopher G. E. Moore (1982) at the beginning of the last century when he announced the "Naturalistic Fallacy", by which he meant the attempt to derive ethical conclusions from nonethical premises. Bertrand Russell initially subscribed to Moore's proposition, but later he argued against it. In our times, the American philosopher John Searle (1964) has actually claimed to have derived an "ought" from a fact within the context of human experience, but then von Wright (1986) critically analysed his argument and found it to be fallacious. MacIntyre (1959) claims that Hume himself contravened his own position, but not all agree with MacIntyre's analysis. Thus do the arguments go back and forth in the empirical-analytic tradition. While there continue to be proponents for both sides, it is admitted that the issue is not yet resolved.

In the continental tradition, the content is different but the disagreements are equally pronounced. Immanuel Kant set the tone for ethical and moral thinking for at least a couple of centuries. His approach was formalistic and aprioristic and it seems that he used that approach because he did not want values to be based upon empirical givens. Later, the German philosopher-psychologist Hermann Lotze wanted to protect the understanding of values from the encroachment of positivism, and so he defined values in such a way that they were independent of reality: facts had being but values did not. Positivism had

tried to establish a reality free of values so that it would be possible to use the rigorous naturalistic methods of natural science in studying humans and society. In this way, the famous distinction between being and value was introduced with its implication that values have no being - in other words, "oughts" do not have to be (Frondizi, 1971). Max Scheler (1973) also reacted against the emptiness of Kant's formalistic theory and somehow retained Lotze's point by affirming that values did indeed have content but that the content was not empirical; however, following the lead of Husserl, he described values as essential or eidetic. For Scheler, values are neither things, properties of things, nor logical abstractions. Strictly speaking, values do not exist, but are presences that can be intuited by acts of consciousness. Frings (1997) interprets Scheler's values to be functional existents rather than substantive entities. Moreover, Scheler claims that values are given to acts of feeling or emotion, not to thinking or willing. Nicolai Hartmann (1975) also articulated a theory of values in which values are non-existing; that is, they are not empirical. Frondizi (1971), an Argentinean philosopher, believed values to be Gestalts: there is an empirical infrastructure to them, but the values as such are nonempirical, like the wholes that supersede the parts. Several authors have criticized Scheler's critique of Kant, stating that Kant was not as formalistic as he appeared. On the other hand, Heidegger (1962) has severely criticized Scheler's theory of values, but then Reiner (1983) discounted Heidegger's critique because, according to Reiner, Heidegger's critique misses the points that Scheler wanted to make.

Thus, for some philosophers, facts can be valued, but, for others, value is an additional "something" added to facts. In addition, subjective and objective values have been declared and they have been distinguished from, and on occasion identified with, interests, wants and preferences. The precise location of values is still undetermined. Some thinkers claim that they are purely subjective, others that they are characteristics of objects, and still others that values are interactional. These critiques and counter-critiques underscore the instability of the scholarship in this area, probably precipitated by the fact that values may not be simple empirical givens.

A simple example can demonstrate the reality-irreality problem of the fact-value distinction. At this moment in time there is a war in our world. But we can ask, even if war exists, ought there to be a war? The converse also holds: Right now there is not universal peace in the world. But the question can be raised: Ought there to be peace in the world? So it seems as though the concern for value instigates the search for the opposite of what is. But it is not as simple as that. Both what is, and what is not, can raise the question of "ought". The question of value cannot be reduced to one of sheer possibility either, since, if universal peace should come to be in this world, presumably it would be considered desirable, and so an existing fact would then be valued. These are the intricacies that make the study of values so difficult.

However, it is not only the value side of the issue that gets murky. Matters are not so solid on the fact side either. Certainly, from a scientific perspective we understand that facts are correlated with methods, and methods presuppose a theoretical or philosophical framework. We are all aware that the facts of behaviourism are not at all identical with the facts supported by psychoanalysis. However, the British philosopher Lucas (1958), in an interesting article on the status of facts, complicates the matter considerably, arguing as follows:

> Facts, in the popular philosophy of today, are good, simple souls; there is no guile in them, nor any room for subjective bias and once we have made ourselves acquainted with them, we have reached the beginning and summit of all wisdom. This view is false, and not only false, but dangerously false. Facts are not at all what people think they are; they are not the simple solid elements out of which the whole fabric of our knowledge is constructed. ... Facts are not simple definite entities, because the word "fact" is not a simple substantive, but rather [it is] one that is systematically ambiguous. (p. 144)

Lucas (1958) goes on to demonstrate the ambiguity of facts by applying Aristotle's "Method of Opposites" to the term. "What is [fact] being contrasted with? Is it a fact as opposed to fiction? Or as opposed to theory? Or as opposed to an interpretation? Or a question of a fact as opposed to a law? This in itself is enough to show that there is no unitary concept of a fact, but rather a whole sheaf of concepts, bound together indeed, but distinct" (p. 145).

Finally, Lucas (1958) concludes: "For there are no basic facts: there are only facts relative to a dispute" (p. 156). His point is that there is nothing that cannot be reasonably disputed. No fact can satisfy all comers. Consequently, one can only proceed by having the disputants achieve a consensus and then proceed from there. Obviously, things get even more complicated if the meaning of the facts were to be considered.

I went to philosophy in order to find some stability concerning the distinction between fact and value and I found only fluidity. Consequently, I want to leave philosophy and go back to the more comfortable regions of the social sciences. But before I do, I would like to make a couple of remarks. First of all, I would like to note in passing that none of the eastern philosophies split values and facts the way that the West does. To take but one example - Son (1986), speaking from a neo-Confucian perspective, writes:

> None of the three major languages of the Far East, Chinese, Japanese and Korean, have indigenous words for either "fact" or "value". The words currently in use in these languages are approximations, at best expressing in part the meaning of the western concepts. The existing word for "price" serves as the basis for the translation of value and "affairs" is the stand-in for fact. (pp. 149-150)

Son (1986) further states that "Confucians lived in a world of values and were so steeped in it that they failed to notice this. They were aware of no way to abstract brute facts out of the organically coherent whole they conceived the world to be. A brute fact would be something independent of the evaluating or acting subject, and to the Confucian's mind neither a fragmented fact nor a morally neutral subject could be acceptable" (p. 156). Something similar evidently holds for Islamic, Hindu and Indian perspectives. Fact and value are not separated. However, I am not at all an expert in eastern modes of thought, and so I have to grapple with the issues as they present themselves to me in the West.

Secondly, it has to be appreciated that, within a certain tradition, philosophers constantly make distinctions between being and non-being. We have seen that facts are considered to be real, or empirical, which means given to the senses in some public way, and it has been argued that values as such are irreal. And Hume said that he could not find a bridge to go from facts to values. Kant had said that existence adds nothing to essence. That is, if an essence were determined, and then it was noticed that the essence actually existed, that fact would add nothing to the essence. Husserl (1982) also wrote that sciences of facts and sciences of essences had to be distinguished, and that, based upon what the essence provided, not a word could be said about factual matters. This distinction can be found in Plato, of course, who believed that ideas were the superior reality and actual existences were but shadows of the ideas. The question is, why does western philosophy find it necessary to posit the ideal or irreal? Are there indeed some phenomena that escape the empirical approach, and is a scientific approach to such phenomena really impossible? There are philosophers who object, of course, but the idealistic tradition is too strong to easily negate. So the whole fact-value dichotomy revolves around the differential ontological status of facts and values. Moreover, it is when one considers values or moral or ethical phenomena that the possibility of ideal objects presents itself. Could that be a reason that natural science approaches want to separate facts from values? Ideal phenomena would challenge the basic approaches of the natural sciences. In any case, as a psychologist, I cannot resolve the ontological issue. But let's see how values show up in psychology.

Values in Psychology

Despite philosophy's sharp distinction between facts and values, psychology has not hesitated to investigate values. In fact, the presence of values goes back to everyone's favourite founder, Wilhelm Wundt, although it is the side of Wundt to which history has not been kind. Wundt's legacy, until relatively recently, has been reduced to being the founder of a laboratory and to being the successful initiator of psychology as a natural science. But Wundt also differentiated psychology from the typical natural science approach, and because, as it is said, history is written by winners, the more humanistic side of Wundt has been obscured. In any case, Wundt postulated a "psychical causality" which differed from physical causality in that the explanation "of psychological processes is everywhere shot through with value determinations" (Mischel, 1970, p. 8). For Wundt, there is no psychological structure which is free of values, and to rule the consideration of values out of psychology would, for him, be a logical error (Mischel, 1970). Wundt (1907) says this in the following way:

> *Psychical* measurement … deals in the last instance in every case with *qualitative values*, that is, values that vary in degrees only in respect to their qualitative character. The ability to produce purely *quantitative* effects, which we designate as *physical energy* is, accordingly, to be clearly distinguished from the ability to produce values, which we designate as *psychical energy*. [Italics in original] (p. 370)

Wundt died in 1920, and in that year the first printing of Eduard Spranger's *Types of Men* was published in Germany. Spranger (1928), who was a student of Dilthey, investigated the personal values that

motivated humans and came up with six ideal types: theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political and religious. This typology became the basis for the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values test that was quite popular in the 1950s. In 1932, Piaget published *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, which dealt with his questioning of children about the rules of the games they played in order to see how moral values developed. In 1938, Wolfgang Kohler published his respected work, *The Place of Values in a World of Facts*, in which he spoke about the objective requiredness or demand characteristics of certain situations, which he identified as values. Other studies of values were also taking place, and in the 1940s the number of studies increased to such an extent that a careful historical record is hard to track.

The attitudes of psychologists to the study of values in those times is perhaps best conveyed by Brewster Smith (1969): "Of course social psychology must grapple with human experience in society; of course it is inextricably concerned with human values - or so I have always thought ... . But the psychologist's social psychology of the 1930s has really very little to offer the understanding of man's social experience or to the clarification of man's social problems" (p. 2). Smith felt that he could make such a statement despite the appearance of J. F. Brown's (1936) radical approach to the social based on Marx and Freud and the contributions of G. H. Mead (1934), also in the mid-1930s. The former book did not have much impact because its radical views could not get a foothold in the U.S. culture of the '30s, and the latter's work was slow in getting the recognition it deserved. In the 1950s, Allport's (1954) work on prejudice came out, and in the 1960s Kohlberg (1963) embarked on his famous studies of moral development, which were subsequently followed by Gilligan's (1982) feminine perspective on moral development.

Today, studies of values in psychology have proliferated to such an extent that it is hopeless to even attempt a summary. Studies range in focus from value priorities through the dynamics of value systems and value-expressive attitudes to post-positivist developmental research, ethics of interpretation, and arguments for the priority of the ethical over the epistemological in psychology as postulated by Levinas. Whatever the ontological status of values may be, psychologists have not asked that question and have instead studied values as experiential or conceptual phenomena. Psychologists' asking persons about values has typically elicited responses in terms of behaviours or experiences that are susceptible to being measured.

It is interesting to note that Kohlberg was a bit more sophisticated about the philosophical status of values, even though he went against the typical philosophical interpretation in his writing of an article entitled "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It". However, that Kohlberg (1971) actually respects the fact-value dichotomy is evident from the following:

> ... there are two forms of the "naturalistic fallacy" that we are not committing. The first is that of deriving moral judgments from psychological, cognitive-predictive judgments or pleasure-pain statements, as is done by naturalistic notions of moral judgment. ...The second naturalistic fallacy we are not committing is that of assuming that morality or moral maturity is part of man's biological nature, or that the biologically older is better. The third form of the "naturalistic fallacy" which we *are* committing is that of asserting that any conception of what moral judgment ought to be must rest on an adequate conception of what it is. (p. 222)

I'm not sure that Kohlberg's argument resolves the issue. The fact that he found a Stage 6 level does not mean that there ought not to be a Stage 7 level of moral maturity, but the point here is that, while respecting the dichotomy, Kohlberg wants to argue that facts do have implications for oughts.

Values are pervasive phenomena, and so, while psychologists were not deterred from studying them, they did not always fully realize that they were expressing them as well. To be sure, it takes a reflective, critical attitude to notice the values expressed by the strategies that psychologists adopted. And it is the critical psychologists who make clear the implications of the strategies that psychologists use to study not only values, but all phenomena. However, mainstream psychologists hardly seem to be bothered by such criticisms. While there were earlier criticisms, I shall report only a couple of the more recent ones. Sullivan (1984), for example, wrote:

> ... psychology as a science is a theoretical (epistemological) and not a normative (ethical) science. In relation to facts and theories generated by psychologists, these are to be considered free from ethical norms (i.e. value-neutral). As a science, psychology is amoral and apolitical. (p. ix)

Sullivan attributes this attitude to psychologists' socialization as natural scientists. He then goes on to

argue that his book will go on to challenge all of the assumptions of psychology as a natural science. He states that the "issue of value neutrality is an impossible, unrealistic and - in the end - undesirable ideal for psychologists to be pursuing". He asserts that he views "the pursuits of psychologists as ethical enterprises" and that this requires "a radical shift in ground from a theory (episteme)-practice (normative) dichotomy to that of a praxis orientation". Obviously, Sullivan is not against theorizing but is proposing a type of theorizing that is based upon reflections on human actions. He also makes explicit that his interest is in emancipatory goals rather than those of control.

In 1991, Tolman and Maiers published a series of articles that reflected the views of Critical Psychology as presented in the work of Klaus Holzkamp and his students in Germany. They criticized mainstream psychology because it is guided by the interests of the establishment (Tolman & Maiers, 1991, p. 3). They believe that psychology should not have values that indicate that it serves the dominant interests within society. According to them, mainstream psychology, whether it realized it or not, had aligned itself with one segment of the population (the privileged) against another (the working class). The authors acknowledge that psychological knowledge and practices would always be tied to interests, but critical psychologists want those interests to reflect all of society and not just the privileged.

In 1994, Prilleltensky wrote a book in which he established that, as a whole, the discipline of psychology preserves the societal status quo. His concern is for "the social ethics of psychology and the moral consequences of the discipline for the acceptance and transformation of power relations in society" (Prilleltensky, 1994, p. 3). He laments that the term "critical thinking", when applied to psychology, refers "exclusively to epistemological considerations such as methodological rigour, logical reasoning in deriving conclusions and adequacy of generalizations" (p. 4). Prilleltensky's aim is to extend the term to the "examination of the social, political and moral assumptions implicit in psychological theories and practices" (ibid.). According to him, what obscures psychology's efforts to preserve the status quo are its emphasis on, and belief in, the supremacy of the self, ideology, and the procedures of science and technology. He goes through the various approaches to psychology as well as several subfields and demonstrates how his criticism is supported. He notes that there are a few exceptions that go against the grain - such as the Freudian left and feminist psychology - but unfortunately his major thesis is upheld. He also notes that the dissidents do not make much headway.

It is interesting to note that those who study values held by individuals, with few exceptions, almost always use methods of measurement; whereas those who study values as expressed by the institution of psychology never use measurement techniques. Maybe that is why these two aspects of psychology do not touch.

Values for a Human Scientific Psychology

The minimum that one can say about values is that they refer to what is worthy and desirable - and presumably what is desirable is good. So, what would be good for psychology, especially a psychology that is focused on human beings? For one thing, we would expect it to understand human beings adequately and to work for a world in which humans could not only live happily with each other but one in which they could actually thrive. As a psychologist, I therefore unabashedly profess values for the discipline of psychology: I engage in psychological work for the betterment of humankind. Knowledge, like money, is of no value unless it is used.

Now, if we turn to the question of establishing a psychology that is adequate to human beings, what are some of the values that need to be respected? First, I would like to get an obstacle out of the way. After half a century of struggling with the issue, I would now recommend not using any model of science in this process. Rather, I would suggest that a human science approach would try to capture the truth about human beings in logically coherent and disciplined ways, and whatever worked in this effort I would declare to be scientific. After all, that is much closer to how the natural sciences were founded. At the beginning they did not have a model of how to be scientific. Rather, they encountered their concrete phenomena, interrogated them intelligently, and, when they came up with solid findings, they retrospectively formulated principles of scientific practice. That would be a truly empirical way of establishing a human science approach for psychology, especially since the very idea of a human science is still incomplete.

My main criterion for a fruitful psychology is that I do not want it to be reductionistic. The full humanness of each participant in research should be allowed to be present in psychological research. One way to acknowledge this point is to assume that the participant has all of the characteristics that the researcher has. The only relevant difference between a researcher and a participant is one of role in a cooperative situation. As Danziger (1990) has pointed out, this is the way research started in Wundt's

laboratory. Wundt himself was often the participant, but, in any case, both researchers and participants came from the same group of university students and professors. They interacted with each other on pretty much a daily basis and even spent leisure time together. It is also the way my own training in psychophysics took place. All of the students working for my major professor, Dr Zegers, knew each other and we served as experimenters and participants for each other, including Dr Zegers. We were friends before the experiment started, but we knew that, when we served as participants, we had to assume a certain role, and when the experimental session was over, the role ended and we were friends again. We certainly were not strangers to each other. Perhaps this easy switching of roles was aided by the fact that all of the experiments were sensory-perceptual in nature, but there was never any diminishment of the person serving as participant, nor any judgment of the data produced. I believe that that is how it should be for such circumstances, but certainly not the only way that research has to be.

Now, of course, to say that the full humanness of the participant has to be present is not to say that there are not limits. The research situation is a limited situation, and so the way in which the full human participates is also limited. But it should be the full humanity limited in a relevant way. That is, the participant should feel free to be present in the manner he or she wishes within the constraints of the instructions, including ceasing to participate in the research if so desired. For me, the minimum that should have the possibility for being included are the following dimensions of personhood: Sociality, Historicity, Embodiment, and Expressiveness. These dimensions, of course, are highly general and could easily be broken down into more specific categories. *Sociality* can include class, familial relations, distant friends, and so forth; *Historicity* could include many senses of temporality, biographical information, all sorts of past experiences, and so on; *Embodiment* could include spatiality, acquired skills, emotional tensions, and such like; and *Expressiveness* would include physiognomy, meaningfulness, emotional communications, and so on. All of these dimensions should be relevant to the theme of the research insofar as the participant spontaneously determines them to be. But, of course, it is not necessary that all of these dimensions be present in every piece of research, although the possibility for them to be present should exist, as well as the participant's right not to speak to all of the dimensions.

By sociality I mean the fact that, to the extent to which others have contributed to the nature of the experience being reported, to that extent such information should be contained within the data. Likewise the relevant historical dimensions of the experiential situation being reported should also have an opportunity to be included. Every situation has a prior context, and knowledge of that context is important for ascertaining the proper psychological meaning. Since humans are always embodied, the role of the body should be included to the extent that it is relevant. Expressiveness implies that the participant should be permitted to include all relevant issues that matter to him or her. Obviously, surveys and questionnaires that merely require check marks or the encircling of a number do not meet this requirement. Finally, expressiveness includes the notion that there should be sufficient openness in the research situation to make it possible for what the research situation meant to the participant to be adequately ascertained. In other words, the research situation should be a genuine dialogical situation wherein the participant contributes at least as much, and preferably more, to the filling out of the situation as the researcher does. Such open-endedness is truly helpful when it comes to making discoveries about experiential phenomena.

Embodiment is a constant with humans, but it is often taken for granted and frequently not mentioned in descriptions that do not focus on the body. Sometimes this neglect of the body is reasonable, and at other times its role might have to be brought out. The opportunity to express oneself fully is an extremely important factor. The researcher may know theories and the literature, but he or she does not know the relevant dimensions of the concrete experience being reported by the participant. Only an open-ended invitation can provide that information. Finally, it is not the facts or the details as such that are most important for psychology, although necessary, but the *meaning* of the facts for the participant as uncovered by the psychologist.

One difference in relation to mainstream psychology is that these dimensions are left more open-ended in the type of research that I am advocating, which is descriptive and qualitative and based upon Husserlian phenomenology. I believe that even mainstream psychology values the dimensions that I am speaking about, but experimental psychologists tend to want to control those dimensions rather than discover their specific role in the overall concrete experience. Thus sociality is often controlled by limiting one group to working class participants and ensuring that another group has only upper class participants, or controlling for any number of other social categories, and then one tries to account for differences in performance in terms of the social categories selected in an a priori way even though many factors not controlled for could be equally contributory to the differences

between the groups. The same is true for the participant's personal history. Experimentalists try to control for past experience, but it is usually uni-dimensional. Thus, either a participant had a certain experience or not, or else the participant was knowledgeable about the experimental task or was a novice, and so on. Again, the past is, as a rule, subsumed under an abstract category, and the many specific variations within that category are assumed to cancel each other out. But the role of the specifics is not really accounted for.

For a reason that I don't quite understand, there seems to be much scepticism concerning concrete, particular, descriptive data. Yet, for me, after working with such data for about half a century as a researcher, I cannot imagine using any other type of data. Much of what is psychologically interesting is not in the explicit statement, but in the implicit, the nuance, the taken for granted, or, as Merleau-Ponty (1962) said, in the lived rather than the known. We should not enter into research situations with our categories, as mainstream researchers usually do, but emerge with them after a careful analysis of a rich concrete description. One will then find a degree of complexity that a single word cannot easily capture.

What I am articulating is very much in line with, but not identical to, the idea of a concrete psychology as conceived by Georges Politzer (1994), the Hungarian-born, French educated philosopher-psychologist who was highly influential in Paris in the 1920s and '30s. He was highly critical of the Wundtian laboratory psychology, which he considered to be both abstract and an unnecessary doubling of all of reality by trying to come up with a representation in consciousness of everything that was already in the world. He wanted psychology to turn to the concrete experiences of ordinary people as they experienced them in the world.

I do follow that last suggestion, so please allow me to present a brief description as an example of what I mean. I use brief examples, such as the one I am about to present, in workshops and for demonstration purposes, because the data that is normally obtained in genuine research is too lengthy to cover adequately in brief time periods. The question put to this participant was simply: "Please describe for me a situation in which you said 'No' to a request." The woman who obtained this description felt that there was a gender difference in the ability to say "No" to requests due to socialization, and so she put this question only to women. I will present the written response she spontaneously received from a married woman in her forties. After a few more comments about the research approach, I will indicate how the

dimensions of personhood manifest themselves in descriptive data.

Saying "No" to a request

This is a short essay on an occasion when I said "no" to a request that was made of me. I need to fill in the background previous to the episode that I relate.

On returning to Ireland to live by the family I was located about twenty-five minutes from where my parents lived who were then seventy years of age. My father still worked and my uncle Michael who also worked had moved in with my parents to share expenses and be of assistance to them in daily chores. It was a very agreeable arrangement for all.

My mother was diagnosed with terminal cancer in September and Kevin and I offered to move her and my father into our home for the length of her illness. We made those arrangements; my father still went to work and my brother and sisters contributed to the expense of having daily help in the house from Monday to Friday. It was a difficult time but a rewarding time and there was no conflict during the time of her illness. In December her doctor said we should move her back to hospital as the fluid was increasing in her lungs; however, her pain was still manageable at home so I insisted we keep her at home through Christmas. On the 2nd of January she had to be moved back to the hospital where she was put on heavy medication and the doctor thought it was only a matter of days until her death. My father returned to his own home, which was only 5 minutes from the hospital. My uncle was there to take care of him and they visited my mother on a daily basis. My mother died on January 7th. I then made an arrangement that my father and uncle would come to my house every Tuesday for dinner and visit with all of us. I presumed that my father and uncle would continue to live together. On the fourth Tuesday my uncle could not come and my father came alone. When it was time for us to drive him home he asked could he stay the night? I had a feeling of panic that if I acceded to his request it would be the first step in having him move in with me. The following thoughts flew through my mind: resentment that he

ignored I had six children and lived in a rented house. (Our plans had been put on hold until my mother's crisis had been dealt with); that I had been completely supportive of his needs during and after my mother's illness and how much more did he want? that he was very fortunate to have my uncle, as companion, housekeeper and assistant, which circumstances a lot of widowers did not enjoy; it would be setting a precedent; he ought to make an effort to fit into his new life where I would continue to be supportive of him; I needed time to get used to my mother's loss and recover from the previous three months and didn't he realize that? why was there no other sibling taking an active role in practical help for him?

I felt a driving conviction to say "no" but how do you say that to your father?

Saying "yes" to him presented a snow-balling unknown to me and one which I felt inadequate to deal with. I chose with trepidation to say "no" to him. I told him that in staying the night it would be harder for him to go home the next day and that I would have to move the children around to find a suitable place for him. He accepted my decision and there was never any sign that he held any resentment towards me. I was very relieved over the next few days and weeks as he continued to visit us on Tuesday nights and I found more ways to be supportive of him. However, in a short time, he found another alternative to being alone. This alternative left my uncle with no alternative but to move, a fact which gave me no joy. I feel there was several paths our lives could have taken that night and I feel that if I had had confidence in his personality to be agreeable and flexible it would have been easier to make a different decision.

I think that most psychologists would agree that the description contains some interesting psychological dynamics. Sociality is clearly present as can be seen from the fact that the participant had to say "No" to her father at a particularly sensitive time since the mother had recently died, and we know that there was an uncle on the scene who could be helpful to her father, and that the woman had six children of her own to worry about. Historicity is present, since we learn to whom the participant must say "No" and the web of relationships that were involved over time

with her father, especially recently with the death of the mother. We also know that the woman had made special accommodating efforts recently because of the mother's illness and that the request was basically demanding more from her as the daughter. The opportunity to express fully what the participant wishes to share with us is there because the question is completely open-ended. And the participant is indeed expressive. She even shares with us a series of thoughts that were running through her head when her father asked to stay for the night. The task then becomes one of understanding these expressed lived meanings in a psychological way.

The one dimension missing in this brief account is embodiment. But I think that, in this case, its absence is not critical, because it would be one of the contributors to how the participant was feeling about saying "No", and there were several emotional expressions covering that aspect of her experience. For example, she said that she had a feeling of panic when her father asked if he could stay the night, and she said that she responded with a feeling of trepidation when she denied his request. In a longer interview, one could ask her to say more about her panic and the trepidation she felt, and bodily responses would most likely emerge. But, even in the present account, aspects of embodiment show forth.

It is necessary to appreciate that what we ask from our participants is a description of their experience. A description of an experience is not necessarily coequal with all of the relevant existential factors. While a good, concrete description always exceeds what the person may believe he or she is saying, it also may leave gaps with respect to what a reflective, existential analysis may come up with. These gaps, I believe, are highly revelatory, and I, for one, do not feel the need to fill them in without a serious reason. Rather, to me, they are invitations to explore the psychological meanings of or motives for the gaps. The reasons for the gaps may be trivial or they may be psychologically loaded. Only a subsequent investigation will reveal their true meaning.

Moreover, this approach does not limit us to merely idiographic results. To be sure, if one were interested in only this woman, as a therapist might be, then this description would be helpful in knowing how to approach a discussion of her difficulty. But, as scientists, we are interested in general findings and I think that they are available, especially if one had several such descriptions. The availability of eidetic intuitions makes a certain degree of generalization possible. But, even limiting ourselves to just this one example, a researcher could at least say that persons have difficulty in denying requests to family members

whom they perceive to have been extremely helpful to them. Are exceptions imaginable? Of course, although I don't think that we should be seeking universal laws in the human sciences so quickly. But certainly generalities are desirable.

Gurwitsch (1964) asserted that "organization is autochthonous to experience" (p. 30). That is, experiences are intrinsically organized, and that organization is provided by human subjectivity, with the clue to its comprehension being through the meanings expressed in the description. That is why getting the particularities of an experience is so important, not only for its own sake, but also as the basis for generalizations. Abstract and a priori approaches miss the relevant details. The woman who said "No" to her father gave us the information we needed in order for us to understand why she had to say "No" and why it was difficult for her. She gave us the pertinent social, historical and personal information. Psychology can only proceed on the basis of such facts, but the facts must be made relevant for psychology.

It is important to realize that it is the meanings of the experiences for the participants that have to be discovered and understood. To be useful to psychology, the above description requires a transformation. The participant wrote from a lifeworld perspective, and what she said has to be understood in terms of the psychological meanings contained in her description, with these meanings needing to be discovered. I cannot go into the methodological procedures that need to be followed to do this here (see Giorgi, 1997; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003), but I want to emphasize that, without concrete, detailed descriptions of experiences, psychology will have trouble advancing. Our raw data cannot be abstract or obtained from an external perspective.

I would like to suggest that meanings are the values of facts. Simply having a fact is not sufficient, because it does not necessarily reveal its relationship to subjectivity. A meaning always does, especially a psychological meaning. In an indirect way, even mainstream psychology respects this understanding, since, after all the facts are reported in the Results section of a research report, the question that is raised is: How are the facts to be interpreted? What is the meaning of the facts? Or, what value do these facts have? This step is necessary with both statistical and qualitative data. To ask about the interpretation of the facts is to ask how the facts relate to our ongoing concerns. It is to ask how the experiencers took up and acted upon the facts. It is to ask why the facts are important for us as human beings. How do they relate to us? Or, why are they valuable? Clearly, values

belong in a human science.

It seems to me that the emphasis on decontextualized facts is a positivistic bias that does not belong in a human science approach. Moreover, the positivistic fact is not experientially primordial, but is constituted on the basis of experience. For example, if I walk into a café and I'm looking for a good spot because I want to do some concentrated reading, and then I notice a table by a window and against the wall and I decide that that is the perfect spot for me at this time, in this mood, for the purpose of undisturbed reading. But then, if someone asks me "What is the spot like?", I actually have to look and see, and I discover that the table has a wire frame and a wooden top, that the wall is brick, and that there is a marble floor. But those are not the elements that served as the basis of my calling that particular part of the café "a good spot". I constituted those elemental facts after I was questioned about the characteristics of the spot. But it is the question that takes the value out of the experience. The primordial experience was value-laden. I was looking for a "good spot" that would satisfy a specific purpose; what was good about the "spot" was its fittingness for my purpose; its relative isolation, its potential for some quiet reading. It is hard to imagine any experience that is not, as Wundt had already observed, value-laden, as was the experience of the woman in our example. The positivistic influence has been to attempt to remove subjectivity from experiences so that there would be pure "isnesses", or facts, remaining. But I think that such an approach severely compromises the genuineness of psychology.

Perhaps the difference can best be expressed by considering the difference between knowing a fact and appreciating a fact. Facts may simply exist in the natural world, but the seeking and discovering of facts always comes from an appreciative context. To appreciate a fact is to know its place within a context, or to understand its relationship to other facts, or to know how to apply the fact once it has been discovered. It is to understand its relationship to human subjectivity. Perhaps we have to be more explicit about the notion that psychology as a human science is an appreciative or evaluative science. We cannot have a human science with the relationship to human subjectivity removed.

Summary

Let me close by reviewing the problem of values in science, turning again to the example given. The researcher, for her own reasons, decided to research the experience of denying a request on the part of women. This certainly expresses a value, but it is

what Weber called a "value orientation" and so it is acceptable. Value orientation is the researcher's personal interest in a phenomenon and offers no problem. The woman who wrote the description also expressed many values, but it has been explicitly stated that, when the empirical subject expresses values as part of the data, that too is acceptable. Such data can be analysed. What a researcher is not allowed to do is to either praise or condemn the woman for saying "No" to her father on the basis of the researcher's personal value system. But what if the data reported here was part of a systematic, methodical study using, say, 15 or 20 participants, and the conclusion were the same? Then one could report that it is sometimes preferable to say "No" to a parent and refer to the relevant data. The findings, thus, would no longer be "value-free" and yet would have scientific backing.

With respect to the "fact-value" dichotomy, let us suppose that there are customs or traditions in a certain region of a country that dictate that one should always obey one's parents, regardless of circumstances. Then someone belonging to that tradition reads the results of the imagined study I just suggested. Then, because there was supporting data, the woman changes her mind and decides that there may be occasions when it is morally right to go against a parent's wishes. I would then say that awareness of certain meaning-laden facts changed the value structure of that person. So, I agree in general with Kohlberg and Taylor: except that I would say that meaning-laden facts can change values. Thus our methods must allow more fully for the expression of the meanings intended by our research participants as part of our data, rather than just accumulating facts.

I have covered the main points in the scholarly literature concerning science and values, but, instead of coming to a conclusion, I find myself confronted with two problems. The first deals with the kind of discipline that psychology ought to be. The very fact-value tension that was being discussed confronts me.

Yes, a type of psychology exists, but is it the best one for understanding human nature in psychologically penetrating ways? When Mill first discussed this topic, he called it the "moral sciences". The idea went to Germany and "moral sciences" was translated as *Geisteswissenschaften*, which means sciences of spirit or mind. When it came back into English from Germany, the term got translated as "human science". It seems that the whole sense of the moral got lost in these multiple translations.

Then I had a shocking insight: Have I - have we - done the same thing here that Allport did when he substituted "personality" for "character"? Have we accommodated so much to a sense of science - no matter how liberal - that we have lost something essential in our subject matter? Are we committed only to the epistemological task and not to the evaluative one? With the idea of "value neutrality" as popularly understood, the scientific culture seems to be moving in that direction. However, in principle, I would say "No" - because the same human subject who seeks to know also evaluates. Whatever the difference in those two modes of questioning, the basis of integration lies in that fact.

The second problem relates to the scientific perspective itself. Must everything believable be bound to the scientific perspective? I want to affirm that the scientific perspective is not absolute and that there can be rigorous moral or ethical thinking outside the scientific context that could challenge science's self-interpretation to be value free. More forcefully, I would want to assert that there could be values arising from everyday life that could also set limits to science's value free self-interpretation. An ordinary citizen could say, for example, that atomic bombs should not exist since their use only results in death and destruction. Even scientists should respect the value expressed in that argument.

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About the Author

Amedeo Giorgi received his PhD in psychology from Fordham University in 1958. He was trained in experimental psychology and pursued a career in academic psychology. Having found that the standard experimental and quantitative procedures being pursued by mainstream psychology missed the genuine psychological questions that ought to have been asked, he turned, after a long search, to phenomenological philosophy as the basis for a more adequate methodology for psychology, as well as the basis for a non-reductionistic philosophical anthropology. He is currently employed at Saybrook Graduate School in San Francisco, California, primarily teaching courses in phenomenological methodology and phenomenological psychology.

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